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Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era
Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernization
Analytical Questions

T

his study addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civilmilitary relations during the post–Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of
this change for China’s crisis management and its naval modernization?
Why Important?
Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. First, because the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its primary function is domestic politics—that is, to participate in party leadership factional
politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition
from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been employed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition
from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA’s ground force, which is manpowerintensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been
continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate
for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence
but are inappropriate for domestic politics—such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air
Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force)—have been more
privileged in China’s military modernization drive.1 This study, by examining change in
Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle.
Second, China’s civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the
post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and
careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims
to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well.
Finally, the PLAN was previously marginalized within the PLA, partly because the latter was largely preoccupied with domestic issues and politics, where the PLAN is not
especially useful. By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also
attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more important in China’s military policy.
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Background: Legacies of Mao and Deng
Traditional analysis of China’s civil-military relations assumes that the relationship
between the CCP and the PLA remains symbiotic, without functional differentiation
or technical specialization–based institutional boundaries. Such a symbiosis has been
attributed to Mao Zedong’s reliance on a strategy of manpower-based mass mobilization
rather than functional and technical specialization–based expertise and administrative
efficacy for his revolutionary agenda and post-revolutionary development. A product
of civil war and revolution, the PLA was naturally an integral part of Mao’s strategy.
Party-army “symbiosis” did not imply the lack of political dynamics; on the contrary,
political rivalries and alignments were rampant in the Mao years and immediately after.
But rather than party-army institutional boundaries, highly personalized leadership factions defined these rivalries and allegiances, which cut across and weakened further the
party-army boundaries. That is, a few political-military factions engaged in a zero-sum
struggle for political power.2
Photo 1. Mao met with PLAN sailors in 1953. But the PLAN was largely neglected by Mao
because he wanted “politics to take command” in the PLA.

The rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, however, led to the replacement of Mao’s
revolutionary agenda with a nation-building project of “four modernizations”—
modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. It was
recognized that technical expertise and administrative efficiency based on a division of
labor are indispensable for such tasks. As a result, functional differentiation and technical specialization have been promoted. Institutional boundaries between the party and
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the army became clearer, so that the latter could enjoy more institutional autonomy to
pursue its functional and technical expertise. This trend was reflected in the downsizing of the PLA by a million billets during 1985–87, the reduction of its role in domestic
party and societal politics, the decline of cross-boundary circulation of elites, and the
concentration of the armed forces on the military-technical tasks of modernization.3
Photo 2. Deng reviewing PLA troops on 1 October 1984.

There was, however, one caveat. At the top leadership level, such as the Central Military
Commission (CMC), Deng’s informal and personal influence remained substantial and
institutional prerequisites were not so important. Deng, for instance, held the position of
CMC chair from 1981 to 1989, though he did not hold the position of the CCP general
secretary from 1981 to 1987 or any party or state portfolio between 1987 and 1989.
Deng’s command of the military was based largely on his revolutionary and military credentials, as well as his status and prestige as one of the founders of the People’s Republic
of China and the PLA. Moreover, Deng appointed to key CMC positions close allies, like
Yang Shangkun (CMC vice chair from 1981 to 1992 and CMC secretary general from
1981 to 1989) and such pre-1949 Second Field Army (where Deng served as political
commissar) comrades as Qin Jiwei (CMC member and defense minister from 1987 to
1992), Liu Huaqing (CMC deputy secretary general 1987–89 and CMC vice chair 1989–
97), and Yang Baibin (CMC member 1987–89 and CMC secretary general 1989–92).
These personal factors prompted Deng to employ the PLA covertly against political
opponents within the party, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and explicitly against
threats from society such as the popular rebellion in Beijing in the summer of 1989. The
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PLA’s intervention in 1989 led some scholars to argue that the emphasis of China’s civilmilitary relations had shifted from military tasks to politics.4 Based on similar logic, the
conventional wisdom suggests that Jiang Zemin, as the CMC chair 1989–2004, employed
the PLA largely for factional struggle against political opponents within the CCP leadership, particularly in times of power transition.5
Useful Concepts
The mobilization of armed forces against domestic political opposition or inserting
them into domestic politics constitutes what Samuel Huntington calls “subjective control,” which aims to enhance civilian power by a “divide and rule” strategy of “politicizing” the military. It is also intended to preempt such major military interventions as
coups. Subjective control is based on the premise that undesirable military intervention
in politics is caused not by weak or failed civilian governance but rather by excessive
institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military, fostering managerial ability,
an ethos of public service, and internal cohesiveness and inculcating with the “military
mind” skepticism regarding politicians.6
“Objective control,” in contrast, intends to enhance the institutional autonomy and
professionalism of the military. It is based on the premise that coups and the like are in
fact caused by weak or failed civilian governance or by the inability of civilian authorities to resolve major socioeconomic, political, or foreign-policy crises. It is not a product
of military professionalism, because the military is mainly a conservative organization
that prefers narrow functional and technical expertise to the broad and complex area of
politics.7 In that view, the best strategy to preempt undesirable military intervention in
politics is to enhance civilian governance, not to “politicize” the military.
Central Argument
This study argues that rather than employing the PLA against political opponents from
within the CCP and Chinese society as suggested by the conventional wisdom, postDeng leaders—Jiang and Hu—have prevented the PLA from intervening in intra-CCP
and intra-societal political struggle, by changing the dominant paradigm of Chinese
civil-military relations from subjective control to “objective control with Chinese characteristics.” Such a change, in turn, has major implications for Chinese crisis management
and naval modernization.
To flesh out the central argument, this study makes four specific subarguments. First,
Jiang’s policies with regard to the PLA were similar to what Huntington calls “objective
control”—that is, tending on the civilian side to enhance civilian governance, or the
CCP’s legitimacy to rule, and on the military side promoting functional and technical
expertise, or professionalization of the PLA. Both policies helped to maintain
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civil-military boundaries and contributed to the PLA’s internal cohesion. While there is
an element of subjective control in employing the PLA for power transition and consolidation, mobilizing it into factional rivalries among the CCP central leadership and
in Chinese society, which would have eroded civil-military boundaries and fractured the
military’s cohesion, was clearly not the primary purpose of Jiang’s approach to managing the Chinese armed forces.
Second, Hu Jintao’s policies regarding the PLA, since he succeeded Jiang as the CMC
chair in 2004, have represented not only continuity with Jiang’s policies but also a
significant step in the trend toward objective control, mainly in terms of externalizing
the PLA.8 That is, Hu has required the military to fulfill externally oriented missions that
were absent under Jiang: to secure China’s newly emerging interests in outer, maritime,
and electromagnetic space, and to contribute to world peace by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.
Third, while clearer institutional boundaries may have contributed significantly to the
cohesion and professionalization of the PLA, increased civil-military bifurcation has also
led to pronounced tensions in interagency coordination for crisis management. Such
tensions were more or less evident in such foreign policy crises or events as the EP-3 incident in 2001, China’s antisatellite (ASAT) test in early 2007, the intrusion of a Chinese
submarine into Japanese territorial waters while submerged, China’s refusal to allow the
U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to visit Hong Kong in late 2007, and the USNS Impeccable incident in 2009. They became particularly acute, however, in a domestic crisis of
2009, the Sichuan earthquake. That situation was further exacerbated by a lack of appropriate PLA force structure, equipment, and training for nonwar military operations.
Remedies have been introduced to correct these deficiencies, but major issues remain
unresolved.
Finally, the PLA Navy is probably the biggest institutional beneficiary of the shift toward
objective control and “externalization,” partly because it is one of the most technologyintensive services, and partly because of the specific environment in which it operates
and the functions it is supposed to fulfill. The promotion of the PLAN by the central
civilian leadership and the PLAN’s skillful leveraging of that promotion are also likely to
contribute to its increased importance in China’s military modernization.
Organization
This study has six sections, of which the first is the present introduction. The second
and third sections address Jiang’s and Hu’s policies with regard to the PLA. The fourth
discusses civil-military tensions in interagency coordination in crisis management
stemming from increasing civil-military bifurcation, as well as the prospects for remedies. The fifth section examines the naval implications of objective control and
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externalization. The concluding section summarizes the findings and discusses the analytical implications.

Jiang and the PLA
Analysts agree that though he had no service experience and few close connections in
the PLA, Jiang was quite successful in consolidating his power, by exploiting his position as the CMC chair. The CMC chair has the final say regarding all major military
decisions, including appointing senior officers, allocating the budget, deploying troops,
and controlling the employment of nuclear weapons. Jiang was able to win support
from PLA senior officers mainly because he was able to employ his formal position
to promote many of them to higher ranks and to increase the defense budget, which
translated into higher salaries and better living conditions for the military. Jiang was also
quite adept in cultivating and maintaining good relations with all the informal groupings within the PLA leadership, as well as with lower levels, by showing respect for PLA
elders, listening to officers’ concerns on major issues, honoring PLA heroes and traditions, and conducting regular inspection tours of basic-level PLA units.9
Photo 3. Jiang visits with PLAN sailors and officers on 23 December 2000.

Why Power Consolidation?
Some argue that the primary purpose of Jiang’s power consolidation in the PLA was
to employ the military against political threats and opponents from within the CCP
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Table 1. Central Military Commission of the Fifteenth CCP Congress (1997–2002)
Name

Position

Date
of
Birth

Provincial
Origin

Education

Unit Origin

Military Expertise/
Combat Experience

Jiang
Zemin

Chair

1926

Jiangsu

Shanghai
Jiaotong
University

None

None

Hu Jintao

First vice
chair since
1999

1942

Anhui

Qinghua
University

None

None

Zhang
Wannian

Vice chair

1928

Shandong

Nanjing
Military
College

41st Army,
Guangzhou
Military
Region (MR)

Command and staff,
infantry/Civil War

Chi
Haotian

Vice chair

1929

Shandong

PLA General
Advanced
Infantry
School

27th Army,
Beijing MR

Command and staff,
infantry/Civil War and
Korean War

Fu
Quanyou

Chief of
General
Staff
Department
(GSD)

1930

Shanxi

Nanjing
Military
College

1st Army,
Wuhan MR

Command and staff,
infantry/Civil War and
Korean War

Yu Yongbo

Director
of General
Political
Department
(GPD)

1931

Liaoning

PLA Fourth
Political
Cadre School

42nd Army,
Guangzhou
MR

Political work/Civil
War and Korean War

Wang Ke

Director
of General
Logistics
Department
(GLD)

1931

Anhui

PLA Military
College

21st Army,
Lanzhou MR

Command and staff,
infantry/Civil War and
Korean War

Cao
Gangchuan

Director
of General
Armament
Department
(GAD)

1935

Henan

Artillery
Engineering
School, Soviet
Union

General
departments

Military engineering
and administration

Wang
Ruilin

Deputy
GPD
director

1930

Shandong

High school

Confidential
staff, Fourth
Field Army

Confidential work

Guo
Boxiong

Deputy
chief of
GSD and
member
since 1999

1942

Shaanxi

PLA Military
College,
Beijing

19th Army,
Lanzhou MR

Command and staff,
infantry

Xu Caihou

Deputy
GPD
director and
member
since 1999

1943

Liaoning

Harbin
Military
Engineering
Institute

Jilin Military
District,
Shenyang
MR

Political work
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leadership and from Chinese society, lessons learned from the power struggles under
Mao and from the military suppression of the popular rebellion in Tian’anmen of 1989.
Such an argument, however, produces an analytical puzzle. During Jiang’s fifteen years
as the CMC chair (1989–2004), the PLA was in fact not employed to suppress domestic
social unrest, the major type of threat from society.10 Regarding political threats and
opponents from within the CCP leadership, evidence of PLA intervention in intraparty
factionalism struggles at Jiang’s invitation is sketchy. The only evidence produced so far
is the alleged collective support by senior officers of Jiang’s retention of the CMC chair
position at the Sixteenth CCP Congress of November 2002. In this instance, Hu Jintao,
who succeeded Jiang as the CCP general secretary, was assumed to be a potential political threat and opponent to Jiang.11 Some also suggest power struggles between Jiang and
Hu over the role of the PLA in the SARS crisis and with respect to a submarine accident
that occurred in 2003.12 Jiang’s promotion of a few senior officers, including his chief
bodyguard You Xigui, to the rank of general in June 2004 was also interpreted as preparation for a power struggle against Hu.13
Though plausible, such evidence is inconclusive. The alleged collective petition by senior
officers for Jiang to stay as the CMC chair is highly unlikely, for several reasons. Most of
the uniformed CMC members—Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, Fu Quanyou, Yu Yongbo,
Wang Ke, and Wang Ruilin, for instance—were to retire at the Sixteenth Congress. They
had no special incentive to sponsor a petition to keep Jiang as the CMC chair or to
encourage their subordinates to do so. New uniformed members, such as Liang
Guanglie, Liao Xilong, and Li Ji’nai, were too new to sponsor such a petition.14 Also,
military and CCP discipline forbid senior officers (who are also party members) from
organizing such a “collective action”; it is doubtful that anyone would want to risk his
career to engage in politically incorrect behavior. Complaints from senior officers about
the “two power centers” have been reported.15 This contradicts the assertion that senior
officers preferred Jiang to stay on as CMC chair while Hu took over as the CCP general
secretary.
It was actually Hu who proposed to the CCP Politburo that Jiang stay on, to help him
make a successful transition.16 It is likely that Hu, as the first CMC vice chair since 1999,
consulted the remaining military professionals in the CMC (such as Cao Gangchuan,
Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou) and gained their support before he made the proposal.
Jiang stayed on also to push for what he calls “new military revolution” (新军事革命),
or a revolution in military affairs (RMA)–based transformation of the PLA, against the
vested interests.17 Not yet equipped with the political capital that Jiang enjoyed with the
PLA, Hu would have found this agenda more difficult to accomplish had he become the
CMC chair in 2002. This suggests Jiang actually stayed on for two more years to help Hu,
not compete against him.
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Table 2. Central Military Commission of the Sixteenth CCP Congress (2002–September 2004)
Name

Position

Jiang
Zemin (see
table 1 for
information)

Chair

Hu Jintao
(see table
1 for
information)

First vice
chair

Guo Boxiong
(see table
1 for
information)

Vice chair

Cao
Gangchuan
(see table
1 for
information)
Liang
Guanglie

Vice chair

Xu Caihou
(see table
1 for
information)
Liao Xilong

GPD
director

Li Ji’nai

Date
of
Birth

Provincial
Origin

Education

Unit Origin

Military Expertise/
Combat Experience

1940

Sichuan

PLA Military
College,
Beijing

1st Army,
Wuhan MR

Command and staff,
infantry/War with
Vietnam (1979–89)

GLD
director

1940

Guizhou

PLA Military
College,
Beijing

11th Army,
Kunming
MR

Command and staff,
infantry/War with
Vietnam

GAD
director

1942

Shandong

Harbin
Polytechnic
University

Base 52
(Anhui),
Second
Artillery

Political work

GSD chief

There were other institutional limits on the extent of Jiang’s power consolidation in the
PLA and on his use of this power. It is usually argued that Jiang won personal loyalty by
appointing a large number of senior officers. But these appointments can be attributed
to reasons other than Jiang’s intention to consolidate power. PLA Officers’ Service Regulations requires authorization by the CMC chair for the appointment of officers at and
above the divisional command, or senior colonel, level. As a result, Jiang would inevitably have been responsible for a large number of such appointments; he served as the
CMC chair for fifteen years, the PLA is a large bureaucracy with many senior positions
to be filled in so long a period, and higher personnel turnover has resulted from new
term and age limits. Also, the candidates for these appointments were recommended
by the military professionals in the CMC, not picked by Jiang.18 He interviewed some
of the senior candidates, but his knowledge of them was limited by the little time they
spent together. As a result, personal ties were not especially strong. Officers would fulfill
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military tasks on Jiang’s orders; however, without Deng’s credentials, Jiang might have
been unsure that they would follow an order from him to shoot unarmed civilians in
another crisis on the scale of Tian’anmen.
From the officers’ perspective, Jiang was to be supported and obeyed because he was
the commander in chief. But when Hu became the CMC chair in September 2004, their
support and obedience shifted to Hu, as shown by the behavior of Cao Gangchuan, Guo
Boxiong, and Xu Caihou.19 Guo and Xu are alleged Jiang “loyalists” but have not been
replaced by a new entourage of Hu “loyalists”; to that extent, retention, removal, and
new appointments of senior PLA officers are apparently more regularized by institutional and professional criteria (such as term and age limits and performance) than by
the personal connections with and loyalty to individual party leaders. Finally, because
rank affects remuneration and privileges after retirement, sometimes a decision by the
commander in chief to promote officers to higher rank simply expresses appreciation of
their services, by offering better material conditions for retirement. This can particularly
explain such June 2004 appointments as You Xigui. Also, that announcement was made
jointly by Jiang and Hu. This indicates that the transfer of power would take place soon,
but not that there would be a power struggle between Jiang and Hu.
Photo 4. Jiang and Hu speak to PLA delegates attending the second annual meeting of the 10th
National People’s Congress on 11 March 2004.

Defense budget increases also cannot be explained by power consolidation alone. The
1991 Gulf War showed how large the technological gap had become between the most
advanced militaries and the PLA, a gap that could be narrowed only by budget increases.
The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the possibility of U.S. intervention added a degree of
urgency to the need to upgrade PLA capabilities, which would cost money. The post1998 divestiture of the PLA from business activities led to a shortfall in income that had
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to be offset by budget increases. In late 2002, the CMC endorsed a shift in emphasis of
military modernization from mechanization to RMA-based informatization. This made
digitized operational platforms the top priorities for acquisition. Because these items are
technology-intensive, they are also capital-intensive and therefore require more financial
investment. In the meantime, the Chinese economy had been growing rapidly since the
early 1990s, which made it easier to argue for more spending on national defense. All
these points were articulated and socialized by China’s military planners in lobbying
civilian leaders for defense budget increases. The resulting budget growth has continued since the retirement of Jiang from the CMC in 2004, suggesting that the policy has
broader roots than would a crude ploy by Jiang to win support from military leaders.
Objective Control: The Civilian Side
If power struggle is not the primary purpose of power consolidation in the PLA, what
is? Jiang’s power consolidation aimed at implementing two types of policies. The first
was to enhance party-state governance, or the legitimacy of CCP rule, by promoting economic growth and social stability. This would reduce the need to mobilize the PLA into
domestic politics. The second was to confine the PLA to narrow military-technical tasks.
Both approaches helped to maintain civil-military boundaries and enhance the cohesion
of the PLA. In his writings, Jiang particularly stressed the importance of the functional
specialization–based division of labor as society developed.20 This was also a major lesson from the 1989 Tian’anmen incident and the collapse of communism in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991.
The CCP’s dependence on military force in Tian’anmen for its survival, for instance, indicated the failure of the party-state to resolve major socioeconomic crises and implied
its inability to manage social protests other than by such lethal means as tanks and submachine guns. This had contributed to a decline of the CCP’s legitimacy to rule. Also,
there are indications that the PLA was reluctant to get involved in the suppression of
the rebellion, mainly because its image would be damaged.21 Even for Deng, the task of
persuading the PLA to intervene may have been far from easy, and it is likely that he had
to exhaust much of his political capital to accomplish it. As we have noted, new leaders
like Jiang do not possess the revolutionary and military credentials that Deng did, so
they are not confident that the military would take their side in another such crisis. In
the popular revolts that ended communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
rather than taking the party’s side, the military mostly defied its orders.22 This means the
party’s reliance on military force for its survival may not necessarily guarantee success
but may quicken the demise of party rule instead.
These concerns explain why, at the Fourteenth CCP Congress of 1992, Jiang replaced the
post-1989 policy of military control and ideological indoctrination with a new policy
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of economic growth, a policy also associated with Deng’s southern tour in early 1992.23
It was intended to enhance the legitimacy of CCP rule by increasing income, improving
living standards, and providing employment opportunities for the millions of people
joining the labor force every year. It also helped to generate revenue needed for preventing and preempting crises. Strategies have been developed to manage social protests
stemming from the downsides of rapid economic growth, such as massive urban
unemployment due to reform of state-owned enterprises, overtaxation of the peasants,
rampant corruption, wealth polarization, and environmental degradation. These strategies range from soft approaches (such as meeting the demands of the protesters and
improving institutions for monitoring, expressing, and resolving grievances before they
escalate) to hard ones (arresting politically conscious organizers and isolating and containing protests to prevent them from evolving into larger, better organized movements
that challenge the CCP). Similarly, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), which is primarily
responsible for maintaining domestic social stability, has been substantially strengthened, and riot-control units with nonlethal weapons like tear gas and rubber bullets have
been developed and deployed.24 All these have reduced the need to mobilize the PLA
against domestic political opposition.
Objective Control: The Military Side
On the military side, Jiang aimed to confine the PLA to military-technical tasks. For
instance, he endorsed in 1993 the new PLA strategic principle of preparing for local
war under high-tech conditions, in 1995 operationalizing the principle into a policy to
transform the PLA from a manpower-intensive force to a technology-based one. He introduced the concept of “leapfrogging development” (跨越式发展) in 1997, shifting, as
noted above, the emphasis of military modernization from mechanization (that is, adding new hardware platforms) to informatization (developing information technologies–
based network and software) to narrow the technological gap with the more advanced
militaries of the world. This led to the CMC’s endorsement of a policy of “dual construction” (双化建设), referring to mechanization and informatization, in late 2002.25
These technology-centric policies led to decisions to downsize the PLA by five hundred
thousand billets in 1997 and another two hundred thousand in 2002.
Because bureaucracies and the ground force, or the elements most likely to become
involved in domestic politics, suffered the most from the cuts, these decisions erected
more technological barriers between the PLA and domestic politics. It is, for instance,
more difficult to employ in situations of domestic turbulence such technology-intensive
services as the PLAN, the PLAAF, and Second Artillery. The cuts, however, were unpopular in the PLA, because they eliminated numerous billets, particularly in sectors that
believed in manpower-based people’s war and mechanized warfare. Jiang was able to
make these decisions after 1997 mainly because he felt his power was more secure than it
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had been, as support from the top PLA leadership had become more solid with the death
of Deng and the retirement of “old guards” like Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen from the
CMC in 1997. By removing major bureaucratic obstacles, these decisions made it easier
for Hu, in his turn, to consolidate power in the PLA when he assumed power. This shows
that the relationship between Jiang and Hu was actually more cooperative than competitive.
Another major decision endorsed by Jiang and supervised by Hu for implementation after 1997 was to divest the PLA from its business activities, in 1998. This policy
significantly reduced the domestic role of the PLA, so that it could focus on its militarytechnical tasks. Jiang has written that from the day he became the CMC chair, he wanted
to get the PLA out of commercial business.26 He was unable at first to do so, apparently
because it had been more or less Deng’s decision to allow the PLA to go into business;27
many children of the PLA elders were involved, and military units were poorly funded
otherwise. But after 1997 Jiang felt sufficiently secure to introduce this policy without
fear of displeasing Deng and the PLA elders; also, the PLA’s business had grown to the
extent that it began to negatively affect the normal functioning of the national economy,
and Zhu Rongji, the then premier, was particularly concerned. Furthermore, rapid
economic growth had made it possible to allocate more funding to the PLA. Moreover,
the policy presented itself as a good political strategy to control the PLA through control
of the purse, by cutting off its extrabudgetary income. The policy would also help to
reduce bickering over distribution of funds and the incidence of corruption cases among
officers, thus enhancing the internal cohesion of the PLA. Finally, the policy resolved a
thorny issue that may have complicated Hu’s journey to power. This is clearly another
example of cooperation between Jiang and Hu to develop military policy.

Hu and the PLA
Like Jiang, Hu took over, in 2002, the position of CCP general secretary with weak
military credentials, having no service experience and few close connections in the PLA.
Hu, however, had been the first CMC vice chair since 1999 and therefore had developed
good relations with Jiang and the military professionals in the commission. His strategy
initially was to employ Jiang to help him to deal with the PLA. In a “grand bargain,” he
invited Jiang to continue as CMC chair after shedding his other party-state positions.
Hu needed more experience in running the state and the economy and therefore wanted
Jiang to preside over military affairs and foreign policy, where Jiang had more experience.28 Deng had set a precedent of serving as CMC chair without other party or state
portfolios for two years, beginning in 1987.
The strategy also represented a goodwill gesture to Jiang, who seemed eager to show
that he was just as competent a commander in chief as his predecessors, if not more so.
Partly to return the favor, Jiang endorsed the RMA-based transformation, leading to
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the elimination of a large number of senior billets. This benefited Hu, because it made
it easier for him to consolidate power in the PLA in the near future. Jiang stayed rather
low-key and refrained from interfering in Hu’s running of state affairs. By 2003, Jiang
had handed over the foreign-affairs and Taiwan-affairs leadership positions to Hu. Hu
had also begun to preside over major CMC decisions. At a CCP plenum in September
2004, Jiang volunteered to resign from the CMC chair, and Hu took over. More or less as
a reciprocal gesture, Hu codified Jiang’s theory of “three represents” (the party as representing the most advanced productive forces, culture, and the interests of the broadest
masses) into the state constitution and published the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin for
all CCP members to study.
Partly because Jiang held the CMC chair until 2004, and partly because the PLA had
become more professional under Jiang and therefore less politically inclined, Hu did
not focus particularly on consolidating his position in the PLA after 2002 by cultivating
personalized relations with senior officers or making personnel changes. Instead, Hu’s
policies have largely centered on objective control—that is, enhancing civilian governance, thus the CCP’s legitimacy to rule, and endorsing programs that confine the PLA
to its military-technical and external tasks. Both have helped him consolidate power in
the PLA.
Objective Control: The Civilian Side
On the civilian side, Hu has attempted to reverse the excesses of single-minded economic growth, such as the widening of the income gap (which has led to serious social
tension), lack of social security for large numbers of marginalized groups, official graft,
and environmental damage. Hu believes that these issues cannot be resolved by more
economic growth or riot-control techniques alone but rather require dedicated social
policies. Otherwise, they could render economic growth unsustainable, thus undermining the CCP’s legitimacy to rule, possibly triggering socioeconomic and political crises
and military intervention. Hu has worked closely with the premier, Wen Jiabao, to divert
investment from the rich coastal regions to the less developed heartland and the west, reduce tax burdens on farmers, remove restrictive regulations on migrant workers, develop
basic social and medical safety nets for the poor and unemployed, fight corruption on a
more substantial scale, and require “green” gross-domestic-product growth as a criterion
for the career advancement of local officials.
It is still too early to determine the success of these policies, because vested interests
at both the central and local levels have been recalcitrant, and some measures cannot succeed without genuine political reform. The 2008 financial crisis has also cast a
shadow, by making job creation the top priority. But Hu and Wen’s policies have proved
immensely popular among the ordinary people in China, and contributed to the image
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of the CCP leadership as having a heart and a human touch. The perception of fair and
competent governance has clearly enhanced the CCP’s legitimacy. This has helped to
consolidate Hu’s control over the PLA as well, because it has enhanced Hu’s popularity
among PLA officers and in the ranks.29 Also the image of competent civilian governance
reduces the preconditions needed for PLA intervention in politics.
As to maintaining social stability, Hu has continued Jiang’s policy of minimizing the
use of force. To deal with the numerous “mass incidents” (群体事件) concerning land
and property compensation and environmental grievances, officials at various levels are
required to increase transparency, conduct “face to face” explanation, employ persuasion, avoid “politicization” of reasonable economic and livelihood-related demands but
meet them, and refrain from employing public security and PAP forces, which tend to
escalate tension. Officials are also required, after resolution of incidents, to draw lessons
from them, penalize accountable individuals, and formulate new “rectification plans.”30
To implement this policy, about 2,800 party secretaries and two thousand secretaries of
party disciplinary inspection commissions, all at the county level, were brought to Beijing’s Central Party School, the State Administration College, and the CCP Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC) training center for instruction in investigating
graft and abuse of power by basic-level (township and village) officials—offenses that
are major triggers of mass incidents. Similarly, 3,080 public security bureau directors
and 3,500 prosecutors, also from the county level, traveled to Beijing for training in how
to prevent and control, and not escalate, mass incidents and how to “harmonize policepeople relations.”31 Moreover, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council have
recently issued regulations on penalizing and removing officials for major cases of misconduct, including mismanagement practices that trigger mass incidents.32 Similarly, the
CCP CDIC has recently issued regulations on inspection and supervision at the county
level, aimed at bureaucratic misconduct.33 Furthermore, domestic surveillance apparatuses, such as the First Bureau (domestic security) of the Ministry of Public Security and
the Ministry of State Security, have been strengthened to preempt mass incidents.34 Millions of surveillance cameras are also planned for China’s rural communities.35 Similarly,
the PAP has continuously been reinforced to deal with domestic security threats. As the
PLA continues to downsize, more infantry divisions are likely to be converted into PAP
quick-reaction units.36 All these measures have reduced the need to employ the military
against domestic political threats and opposition.
A caveat to the PLA’s relative detachment from handling domestic security threats
concerns its involvement in suppressing the unrest in Tibet in March 2008. It is important, however, to note that the military units involved were relatively few and small
in size and that their involvements were brief. Also, these units deliberately stayed in
the background so that the PAP units could take the lead, mainly providing protected
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transportation to the PAP personnel with their armored personnel carriers. Also, the
denial of Chinese government spokesmen of the presence of military personnel in Lhasa
and the effort made to conceal the license plates of military vehicles at the site showed
that the regime is concerned about the negative image of employing the PLA against domestic political opposition.37 Moreover, in the eyes of many both in and outside China,
the unsettled issues concerning Tibet have both domestic and external, not purely domestic, origins, particularly as compared with hinterland provinces. Finally, in the most
recent riot, in Ürümqi of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, on 5 July 2009, PAP
reinforcement was transported or airlifted by civilian airlines from provinces of Gansu,
Jiangsu, Henan, and Fujian to Ürümqi to “maintain stability” (维稳). No evidence, however, shows that any PLA active-service unit was directly employed.38
These policies could not have been possible without a high level of consensus, based on
power consolidation, among the CCP leadership. This consolidation and consensus are
possible mainly because without a strongman like Deng, institutional positions become
especially important, and Hu, holding the positions of CCP general secretary and state
president, is “the first among equals.” Hu is also assisted by Wen, who heads the State
Council, the most influential institution dealing with nonmilitary affairs in China. Jiang,
though he still held the CMC chair position for a time, was not comparable to Deng in
credentials, status, or prestige; therefore, the position confined him narrowly to military
affairs. Also, Hu’s policies are articulated as a further development of Jiang’s policy of
economic growth, not as an affront to Jiang’s legacy. Both Jiang and Hu want economic
growth to sustain the CCP’s legitimacy to rule. But Hu wants to add a “human face” to
the growth so that it can be more balanced and better sustained. These policies are also
popular. Both made it more difficult for Jiang to mobilize his Shanghai colleagues in the
Politburo Standing Committee against these policies.
Also, Zeng Qinghong, an alleged loyalist of Jiang from Shanghai, jumped on Hu’s bandwagon, because Hu holds formal leadership positions, is popular, and thus represents the
future.39 Jiang’s other allies, like Wu Bangguo and Jia Qinglin, are of mediocre political
acumen and not likely to challenge Hu, and the institutions they head, the National
People’s Congress and the National People’s Political Consultative Conference, are not
highly influential over policies. Jiang’s inability to salvage his Shanghai colleagues, such
as Chen Liangyu, in the countergraft investigations reduced even more the credibility
of a coherent and robust “Shanghai faction” assisting Jiang in his power struggle against
Hu. Most important, Hu’s success in power consolidation within the CCP leadership
has made a significant impact on the PLA’s perception of him. It is likely that most PLA
senior officers see Hu as a prudent and competent leader, and this should contribute to
Hu’s power consolidation to control the PLA.
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Objective Control: The Military Side
On the military side, Hu has continued Jiang’s program of RMA-based transformation
of the PLA. In May 2003, he presided over a Politburo study session where researchers
from the Academy of Military Science (AMS) lectured the members on world trends
in RMA and priorities for China’s military modernization.40 Hu met with Chinese
astronauts and watched the whole processes of launching three manned spacecraft, in
October 2003, October 2005, and September 2008, respectively. He has initiated a campaign to study RMA-related subjects in the PLA and has supported personnel reform
to appoint officers who understand the RMA to higher ranks and key positions. For
instance, Li Ji’nai and Chen Bingde, who ran the Shenzhou V and Shenzhou VI programs,
respectively, now hold the positions of the director of the PLA’s General Political Department and chief of the PLA’s General Staff Department.41 Hu has stressed regular military
training and exercises, rules and regulations, and effective management as major ways to
regulate behavior.42 All these clearly aim to confine the PLA to its functional and technical expertise—a good political strategy to enhance the objective, or institutional, control
of the PLA.
More important, however, at a CMC expanded conference in late 2004 Hu introduced a
new military policy that defined the four missions of the PLA: to “serve as an important
source of strength for consolidating the party’s governing position” (为党巩固执政地位
提供重要的力量保证); to “provide a strong security guarantee for the important period
of strategic opportunity for national development” (为维护国家发展的重要战略机
遇期提供坚强的安全保障); to “serve as a forceful strategic support for safeguarding
national interests” (为维护国家利益提供有力的战略支撑); and to “play an important
role in upholding world peace and promoting common development” (为维护世界和
平与促进共同发展发挥重要作用).43
The first mission may contradict somewhat objective control, or alternatively it may
reflect the “Chinese characteristics” aspect of objective control. But it is the politically
correct thing to say for any new CCP leader, and it really refers to the “party’s absolute
leadership of the army” (党对军队的绝对领导), enshrining civilian control. Party
leadership of the PLA, however, may be largely nominal, mainly because the political
commissar system, the ostensible tool by which the party controls the PLA, is an integral
component of the military command structure, not external to it. As a result, the true
incentive for political commissars is to perform well within this structure so that they
can advance their careers. They are therefore unlikely to investigate deviations and report on military commanders to outside party authorities. A critical test of the political
orientation of the political commissars is a crisis, such as Tian’anmen in 1989. If political
commissars are more loyal to the party than to the PLA, then one should find that the
majority of political commissars followed the order of the party leaders to suppress
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the students but that the majority of commanders refused to do so. Instead, there were
significant numbers of political commissars and commanders on both sides of the issue.
As argued in the introduction of this study, the central reasons for the PLA following the
party order in 1989 was not enforcement of political commissars but Deng’s prestigebased political capital and his loyalists’ control of the CMC.
Also, the post-Mao objectives of the party and the PLA are consistent: to promote
national economic and technological development and national defense modernization.
This is very different from Mao’s time, when pursuit of military expertise was criticized
as practicing a “bourgeois military line” that undermined the chairman’s “proletarian
revolutionary line,” leading to a continuous witch hunt for class enemies in the PLA and
causing severe political divisions there. Finally, the new PLA Political Work Regulations,
issued in late 2003, contained important revisions. One is that political officers are to
“uphold the legal rights and interests of the military and military personnel” (维护军
队和军人的合法权益). They are also to “give full play to the operational function of
political work” (发挥政治工作作战功能), characterized mainly in terms of information
operations, such as “opinion warfare,” “psychological warfare,” and “law warfare.”44 These
revisions were clearly aimed to integrate political officers into the PLA by redefining
their objectives and functional expertise in ways more in line with those of the PLA. All
these indicators show that the best way for the PLA to help in consolidating the CCP’s
governing position is not to intervene in civilian governance but to develop and perfect
its own functional and technical expertise.
The other three missions are more in line with objective control. The second, for instance, refers to continued military modernization to enhance the credibility of deterrence against threats, such as formal Taiwan independence. Strategic stability ensures
a peaceful external environment for economic development at a time when China can
benefit from the U.S. concentration on countering terrorism, from globalization, and
also from the integration of China into the global economy.45
The third and fourth missions were not only absent under Jiang Zemin but unprecedented in PLA history. The third calls on the PLA to secure China’s newly emerging
interests in outer, maritime, and electromagnetic space in addition to its traditional
security interests, such as its sovereign territories, airspace, and waters.46 The fourth is
for the PLA to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations and international
humanitarian assistance. What is remarkable is that these new missions are externally
oriented. Externalization of the PLA is clearly a good political strategy for Hu, if he is to
control the PLA. This is because, as the end of the Cold War showed, a declining focus
of the military on external threats tends to make civil-military relations more difficult to
manage.47
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Power Consolidation
In June 2006, Hu promoted ten senior officers to three-star general and many more to
lower ranks. By July, PLA officers had received a 100 percent increase in their salaries,
and better-quality uniforms had been issued. As early as since 1999, Hu has regularly received briefings on major military policy issues and attended CMC meetings. He has also
paid many visits to basic-level units, attended and delivered speeches at party congresses
of major PLA institutions, and maintained good relations with senior officers. While
these can be interpreted as efforts to consolidate power in the PLA, as discussed earlier,
there are strict limits on how far the new generations of CCP leaders can go to do so and
how they can use such power. In comparison with Deng’s and Jiang’s years, the promotion rate of senior officers under Hu to the rank of general is not high.48 CMC membership at the Seventeenth CCP Congress in the fall of 2007 involved only minor changes
(compare tables 3 and 4). Cao Gangchuan was retired because he was seventy-two, exceeding the normative retirement age of sixty-eight for CMC members. Wu Shengli and
Xu Qiliang, who succeeded the deceased Zhang Dingfa and the sixty-eight-year-old Qiao
Qingchen as the new PLAN and PLAAF commanders, became new members because
the navy and air force commanders have been CMC members since 2004.
Jiang was lenient on disciplinary issues in his early years as the CMC chair, for fear of
offending Deng and the PLA elders, but Hu has been bolder. Wang Shouye, a deputy
navy commander, was dismissed from his office and court-martialed in early 2006 for
taking bribes of millions of dollars and keeping mistresses. Also in 2006, the CMC appointed a small leading group to audit the financial conditions of a thousand senior
officers.49 Similarly, in June 2006 disciplinary actions were taken against four senior and
seven lower-ranking air force officers as the result of a crash of an airborne warning and
control plane that killed forty people in Anhui. The penalties ranged from recording
demerits, serious warnings, and demotions to dismissal from office.50
There are several reasons why Hu has felt secure enough to enforce discipline against
senior officers soon after becoming the CMC chair. Because Jiang’s credentials, status,
and prestige are not comparable to those of Deng and PLA elders, his influence over Hu
is much less than Deng’s and PLA elders’ influence over Jiang. Also, Hu has accumulated
some political capital in the PLA, having been in the CMC since 1999. His objectivecontrol measures have also contributed to the accumulation of this capital. Finally, the
professionalizing trend within the PLA has had a dampening effect on the political
aspiration of senior officers. Because these disciplinary measures were driven by specific
issues, it may be inappropriate to treat them as stratagems meant to politicize and divide
the officer corps in a power struggle against political opponents. In any case, Hu’s nononsense style enhanced his authority as the new commander in chief of the PLA.
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Table 3. Central Military Commission of the Sixteenth CCP Congress (September 2004–2007)
Name

Position

Date
of
Birth

Provincial
Origin

Education

Unit Origin

Military Expertise/
Combat Experience

Hu Jintao
(see table
1 for
information)

Chair

Guo Boxiong
(see table
1 for
information)

Vice chair

Cao
Gangchuan
(see table
1 for
information)

Vice chair
and defense
minister

Xu Caihou
(see table
1 for
information)

Vice chair

Liang
Guanglie (see
table 2 for
information)

GSD chief

Li Ji’nai (see
table 2 for
information)

GPD
director

Liao Xilong
(see table
2 for
information)

GLD
director

Chen Bingde

GAD
director

1941

Jiangsu

PLA Military
College,
Beijing

60th Army,
Nanjing MR

Command and staff,
infantry

Zhang Dingfa

Navy
commander

1943

Shanghai

Qingdao
Naval
Submarine
Academy

North Sea
Fleet

Command and staff,
submarine force

Qiao
Qingchen

Air Force
commander

1939

Henan

PLAAF 6th
Aviation
School

4th Air
Corps,
Nanjing MR
Air Force

Aviator, command
and staff, Air Force

Jin Zhiyuan

Second
Artillery
commander

1944

Hubei

Wuwei
Artillery
School,
Gansu
Province

Base 56
(Qinghai),
Second
Artillery

Command and staff,
strategic missile force
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Table 4. Central Military Commission of the Seventeenth CCP Congress (2007)
Name

Position

Date
of
Birth

Provincial
Origin

Education

Unit Origin

Military Expertise/
Combat Experience

Hu Jintao
(see table
1 for
information)

Chair

Guo Boxiong
(see table
1 for
information)

Vice chair

Xu Caihou
(see table
1 for
information)

Vice chair

Liang
Guanglie (see
table 2 for
information)

Defense
minister

Chen
Bingde (see
table 3 for
information)

GSD chief

Li Ji’nai (see
table 2 for
information)

GPD
director

Liao Xilong
(see table
2 for
information)

GLD
director

Chang
Wanquan

GAD
director

1949

Henan

Wei’nan
Teachers
College,
Shaanxi
Province

47th Army,
Lanzhou MR

Command and staff,
infantry

Wu Shengli

Navy
commander

1945

Hebei

PLA
Measuring
and Mapping
College

6th Destroyer
Flotilla, East
Sea Fleet

Sea measuring and
mapping, command
and staff, Navy

Xu Qiliang

Air Force
commander

1950

Shandong

PLAAF 5th
Aviation
School

8th Air
Corps,
Nanjing MR
Air Force

Aviator, command
and staff, Air Force

Jin Zhiyuan
(see table
3 for
information)

Second
Artillery
commander
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Implications of Civil-Military Bifurcation for Crisis Management
While objective control, or allowing more institutional autonomy for military professionalization, may substantially benefit military modernization, it has also reinforced
civil-military bifurcation, which has produced the unintended consequence of difficulty
in interagency cooperation and coordination in the management of crises. The old
party-army symbiosis, based on personal relationships, may have been characterized by
political infighting among political-military factions, but in times of crisis, such as the
Korean War and the 1979 war with Vietnam, it enabled charismatic political-military
leaders like Mao and Deng to make quick decisions without much institutional hindrance. Since then, the institutionalization of civil-military boundaries that began under
Deng has made it increasingly difficult for the new generations of uncharismatic technocrats like Jiang and Hu to do so.51
Foreign-Policy Crisis Management
There have been several major cases where a lack of interagency coordination appears
to have incurred high costs, at least in terms of diplomacy and image, on China. In
April 2001 a patrolling Chinese jet interceptor collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance
aircraft seventy miles off the coast of Hainan Island, leading to the loss of the Chinese
aircraft, the death of its pilot, and the crash landing of the American aircraft on Hainan,
where the crew was detained. The crisis remained unresolved for about eleven days.52
One major reason for the delay seems to have been that the PLA took a much harder
line than China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), insisting that the United States be
required to terminate its reconnaissance activities in China’s exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) and compensate the Chinese losses. This hard line reportedly made it difficult for
Jiang Zemin to build quickly a civil-military consensus on resolving the issue—whereas
a quick resolution is presumably what Jiang desired, to maintain a good and stable U.S.Chinese relationship so he could focus on issues of economic development.
Similarly, in November 2004 a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine intruded,
while submerged, in Japanese territorial waters southwest of Okinawa for two hours. It
was about a week before the MFA acknowledged the incident, attributing the intrusion
to a technical error, and expressed regret.53 This happened at a time when Hu was preparing to attend an Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum summit in Chile, where he was to
meet with Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi to find ways to improve strained
Sino-Japanese relations. The incident seems not only to have caught the MFA by surprise
but to have added difficulty to Hu’s effort to improve Sino-Japanese relations. It was
even suggested that Hu, the new CMC chair, had not even been aware of the operation.
In January 2007, China launched a ground-based ballistic missile carrying a kinetic-kill
vehicle. It impacted and destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite orbiting 537 miles
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above the earth. The United States, Japan, Australia, and Britain asked Beijing for an explanation but met with prolonged silence. Only after twelve days did the MFA officially
acknowledge the test. China’s space program is largely managed by the PLA’s General
Armament Department; such a belated response suggests that the MFA may not have
been informed of the test. Nonetheless, the test contradicted the image of China as a rising power committed to peaceful development that Hu wanted to project to the world.
The test produced numerous pieces of debris that could interfere with space activities
for years to come, and, more important, might have triggered an arms race in space.54
Just before the Thanksgiving holiday of 2007, the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and
accompanying ships approached Hong Kong to make a long-planned port visit. Without
warning, China suddenly denied them entry; the decision was reversed abruptly, again
without explanation, but the ships were already on their way to Japan. This incident
again seems to indicate a lack of coordination between the PLA and the MFA; apparently
the soldiers wanted to turn the U.S. ships away while the diplomats tried unsuccessfully
to neutralize the fallout. It also implies Chinese insensitivity, in thwarting the planned
family reunion of American sailors. Moreover, this happened only weeks after a visit
to China by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who had aimed to initiate a long-term
dialogue. Again, the disruption seems to have made it more difficult to maintain a stable
U.S.-Chinese relationship, which Hu is understood to have wanted badly.55
In early March 2009, five Chinese ships—two trawlers, two Fisheries Administration
patrol vessels, and a naval intelligence ship—blocked and surrounded the U.S. ocean
surveillance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) seventy-five miles south of Hainan.
The trawlers attempted to snag the towing cable of Impeccable’s sonar array with a grappling hook. The incident led to the exchange of protests between the two governments.
It happened only eight days after the two countries had agreed to restore a military-tomilitary dialogue; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had just visited China, and China’s
foreign minister, Yang Jieshi, was just about to visit Washington, D.C.56 Once more, the
incident clearly made it more difficult to improve U.S.-Chinese relations as China’s civilian leadership appears to have desired.
In these incidents a lack of civil-military interagency coordination may have been the
cause of diplomatic and image costs to China, but several caveats are in order. First,
other related but different factors may have caused delay. The indecision about the EP-3
incident, for instance, may be attributable in part to Jiang’s absence at the time on a
state visit to Latin American countries, to frustration stemming from the PLA’s failure
to recover the lost pilot, or to the absence of a more forthcoming American apology.
Moreover, China’s civilian leader might sometimes prefer the more hawkish positions
of the military, to enhance his bargaining leverage with foreign counterparts in negotiating a resolution. In the case of the EP-3 incident, this bargaining power was further
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enhanced by the fact that China held the crew, which made it difficult for the United
States to retaliate. While China might have paid a high cost if it had indefinitely delayed
resolution of the crisis, China’s civilian leader had no incentive to resolve it too quickly,
on U.S. terms.
In addition, China’s civilian leader may calculate that the benefits of building domestic
consensus outweigh the diplomatic and image penalties of not reacting quickly. This is
particularly the case if these costs are symbolic and difficult to measure or if the chance
of escalation to a real military conflict is low (either because the other side may be
uncertain about the effects of escalation or because China could retaliate effectively).
Collective decision making and consensus building, for instance, have become the new
norms with the end of the era of charismatic leaders. One of the often-cited benefits of
these norms is that they can minimize the chance of such arbitrary and costly decisions
as another costly war or another Cultural Revolution, particularly under a condition of
high uncertainty. As a result, China’s civilian leader has an incentive to abide by these internal norms in a crisis, because doing so will enhance domestic credibility and legitimacy. This also seems a rational choice under conditions of highly imperfect information.
Similarly, one of the new missions Hu assigned to the PLA since becoming the CMC
chair in 2004, as we have seen, was to secure China’s newly emerging interests in outer,
maritime, and electromagnetic space; Hu has also promoted PLA informatization. In
both instances, space capabilities are essential. So Hu had a reason to endorse the ASAT
test, and thereby match his words with deeds, which would enhance his credibility and
legitimacy in the eyes of the PLA high command. In comparison, space debris may be
a minor issue; it did not cause a problem in earlier, non-Chinese ASAT tests. It was also
unclear that the Chinese test would trigger a space arms race, because the military space
programs of other major powers were ahead of the Chinese test; China still has a long
way to go to operationalize its space war-fighting capabilities. Finally, the prolonged
silence and lack of an explanation about the ASAT test were consistent with Chinese behavior with respect to the testing of strategic weapon systems, where secrecy is intended
to aggravate the sense of uncertainty for China’s opponents, thus enhancing the deterrent effect.57
There are other incentives as well for China’s civilian leader not to resolve foreignpolicy crises too quickly on the terms of foreign states. He, for instance, does not want
to be perceived by domestic constituencies as compromising Chinese national interests,
particularly at the time of power transition when he may still be relatively inexperienced
and therefore politically vulnerable. He may also leverage foreign-policy crises to foster
populism and nationalism and to enhance his domestic popularity by scapegoating
foreigners. Jiang and Hu desired a stable U.S.-Chinese relationship, but not at all costs. If
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they were to make too many concessions, their domestic legitimacy may have been hurt
and therefore their rule destabilized.
Furthermore, it may be wrong to interpret some of the cited incidents as instances of
poor interagency coordination. The Impeccable incident, for instance, might actually
show good Chinese civil-military coordination. The two fishing boats that confronted
the U.S. ship directly constituted the first line, backed up by two of China’s Fisheries
Administration patrol ships, which constituted the second line, while a naval intelligence ship formed the third line. Employing civilian ships to confront the American
ship directly seems to have been a well-thought-out interagency plan, calculated to gain
publicity points by showing China as the weak and victimized side. Also, Jin Yi’nan, the
strategic studies director at China’s National Defense University, complains that U.S. reconnaissance in China’s EEZ has been a long-standing thorn in the side of Sino-U.S. military relations. The issue was raised in the PLA’s Beijing meeting with Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney in late February 2009, an event that was
intended to resume the U.S.-Chinese military-to-military dialogue.58 The MFA would
have helped to arrange for the meeting and so would have been notified of the agenda.
The CMC and Hu should be aware of the major issues to be discussed in similar meetings. Finally, making U.S. reconnaissance activities in China’s EEZ difficult is consistent
with Hu’s requirement on the PLA to defend China’s newly emerging interests in China’s
maritime space and with the call by China’s central leadership over the years to “develop
the national maritime consciousness.” As a result, Hu has reason to endorse such a plan
to enhance his credibility and popularity as the commander in chief of the PLA.
Even the November 2007 Kitty Hawk incident may actually reflect a well coordinated
plan. The decision to refuse the carrier’s visit to Hong Kong can be interpreted as an
exhibition of MFA displeasure over a visit by the Dalai Lama to the White House and of
PLA disapproval of a recent American decision to upgrade Taiwan’s missile system. The
quick reversal of the decision would have been meant to show that the demonstration
was measured and limited, that China was still willing to maintain workable relations
with the United States.
The only incident that convincingly shows weak central and civil-military interagency
coordination seems to be the Chinese nuclear submarine’s two-hour, submerged intrusion into the Japanese territorial waters. It is still unclear what caused the intrusion,
but it is highly unlikely that Hu ordered it. Also, the MFA is unlikely to have been aware
of the operation; it would have objected to it as likely to produce a major diplomatic
incident.
Because the costs of these incidents are largely symbolic rather than substantial, there
seems to be no sense of urgency to introduce corrective measures. A central, integrated
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interagency coordinating institution similar to the U.S. National Security Council
has been in discussion for many years, but there is no evidence that one has been fully
established. Also, detailed information about the Chinese foreign-policy processes is
generally lacking. Both factors suggest that any assumption that weak civil-military interagency coordination is causing Chinese delay or dysfunction in crisis response would
be premature.
However, and in contrast to foreign-policy cases, wherein information remains highly
speculative, a domestic crisis offers concrete and convincing indicators on the relationship between civil-military interagency coordination and crisis management. This is because the stakes are much higher in these crises, where there could be huge material and
human losses, which in turn puts the competence and legitimacy of major leaders and
institutions to a critical test. Moreover, more information has become available about
these domestic crises. Finally, such crises are usually followed by observable remedial
mechanisms and measures for prevention and preemption. The Chinese management of
the Sichuan earthquake relief in May 2009 is a case in point.
Domestic Crisis Management: Sichuan Earthquake Relief
On the early afternoon of 12 May 2008, an earthquake of Richter magnitude 8 hit
northern Sichuan Province, which has about eleven million inhabitants. The first
seventy-two hours after an earthquake are critical, and most of the PLA troops
deployed for earthquake relief arrived within this time, with the central objective of
“saving lives” (救人). Within three hours of the earthquake, for instance, the PLA had
mobilized and deployed sixteen thousand troops from the Chengdu Military Region
(MR), the PLAAF, and the Sichuan provincial PAP. Within twelve hours another
thirty-four thousand were mobilized from the more distant Ji’nan MR and the PLAAF
airborne army in Hubei Province. On 14 May another 32,600 troops were mobilized,
including a marine brigade from Guangdong Province and sixty-one helicopters from
army aviation and the PLAAF. In total, China deployed 137,000 troops (including
more than twenty thousand PAP men) for the Sichuan earthquake relief. It is important to note that this employment was mostly requested and authorized by Hu Jintao.59
It is likely Hu was in close contact with Wen Jiabao, who reached the scene of the
quake within two hours after it occurred. This contact is likely to have shaped decisions about the type and scale of the troop deployment.
The PLA transferred more than a million people in distress to safer areas and provided
extensive aids in terms of tents, temporary quarters, food, potable water, medical treatment, and disease control. Nonetheless, the central indicator of “saving lives” was not
impressive: only 3,336 people were saved from the ruins of the earthquake by the PLA.60
In the end, over sixty-nine thousand were confirmed killed, with over eighteen thousand
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reported missing. A more careful examination of the case shows that weak civil-military
interagency coordination was a major reason why the PLA was not able to save more
lives. The episode raises major new issues in China’s civil-military relations, mainly in
terms of interagency coordination–based command and control and also regarding force
structure, equipment, and training in crisis management.
For higher command and control in the Sichuan earthquake-relief operation, a two-level
structure was established: the Army Command Group for Resisting Quake and Relieving Disaster (军队抗震救灾指挥组), headed by the PLA chief of General Staff Chen
Bingde, which is responsible for deploying out-of-area troops to the earthquake region;
and the Chengdu MR Joint Command Department for Resisting Quake and Relieving
Disaster (成都军区抗震救灾联合指挥部), headed by Chengdu MR commander Li
Shimin, which is responsible for deploying all the troops within the earthquake region.
For interagency coordination, the two-level PLA structure was to follow the orders of the
State Council Command Department for Resisting Quake and Relieving Disaster (国务
院抗震救灾指挥部), headed by Wen, who was at the scene of the earthquake.61
Photo 5. Wen Jiaobao issuing orders to a PLA senior officer at the site of the Sichuan earthquake.

As a result partly of the urgent desire to save the lives of the hundred thousand people
trapped in the epicenter of the earthquake, Wenchuan County, and partly of his lack of
understanding of the PLA (stemming from the fact that he had never served in the military), Wen somewhat hastily ordered the PLA to reach the epicenter within thirty-four
hours of the earthquake. The commanders on the scene, however, saw reaching Wenchuan
on such short notice as almost impossible; Wenchuan, although only one hundred
kilometers from the city of Dujiangyan, where most of the PLA troops had gathered, is
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surrounded by impassable mountains, and all the roads were now blocked by massive
rock slides and debris. Efforts to clear the landslides were hampered by incessant rain,
minor quakes, and a shortage of heavy road construction equipment. Wen also requested
the PLA to send helicopters or air-drop troops into Wenchuan. To the PLA commanders, however, because of the rain, quakes, four-thousand-meter-high mountains, and a
visibility of less than twenty meters, such an order amounted to a reckless risking of the
lives of their soldiers. The tension between Wen and the PLA commanders grew to the
point where Wen allegedly snapped, “It is the people who have raised you. It’s up to you
to see what to do! Even with two legs, you must walk in there” (是人民养育了你们, 你
们自己看着办! 你们就是靠双腿走, 也要给我走进去).62
A PLA helicopter attempted six times to reach Wenchuan but failed. As the sky cleared
on 14 May, one hundred paratroopers were airborne; fifteen of them, having left wills
behind, jumped at a height of five thousand meters, with no ground command or guidance, no ground signposts, and no meteorological information. The plan to air-drop the
rest of the paratroopers was aborted when the fifteen, who landed safely, reported that
the terrain was too treacherous for a massive airdrop. In any case, late the night before
a PAP unit had reached Wenchuan by foot, only to find the damage there not as serious
as had been believed. By 16 May Hu had to replace Wen as the commander in chief on
the earthquake scene, partly because it had became difficult for Wen and the PLA commanders to coordinate, as a result of the mutual mistrust that had developed.63
Photo 6. Hu talks with a PLA medical officer at the site of Sichuan earthquake on 16 May 2008.
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For lower-level interagency coordination in command and control, the central difficulty
was the lack of collateral coordination between the PLA units and the county, township, and village government authorities. This is because most of the troops deployed
were centrally or MR-controlled quick reaction forces (快反部队) and strategic reserve
forces (战略预备队), which have no regular or institutional interactions and relationship with the local government authorities. As a result, any coordinated tasks had to
go up and down their own chain of command before approval. This cumbersome and
time-consuming process contributed to a situation where some units idled while none
were available where relief work needed to be done; the units could not adapt well to the
rapidly changing circumstances on the ground.64 A high cost was incurred as a result of
this inability to take timely action.
One major indicator of this weak local interagency coordination was the postearthquake
call by PLA analysts to employ reserve elements (预备役部队) controlled by provincial
military districts (MDs) and local militia for disaster relief. The reserve and the militia units are more familiar with local geographical, social, and cultural conditions and
are closer to crisis locations. But most important, these local units are under the dual
leadership (双重领导) of the PLA and civilian chains of command; provincial and local
party secretaries serve as first political commissars of these units. This institutionalized
relationship would facilitate local civil-military interagency coordination in managing
crises, thus contributing to lower costs and higher effectiveness.65
Another major civil-military issue arising from the PLA’s Sichuan earthquake relief
experience concerns force structure, equipment, and training. Except for a few small
support units specializing in engineering, road construction, transportation, and medicine, which are highly applicable to civil disaster-relief work, the troops deployed for the
Sichuan earthquake were armed and trained to fight conventional wars. Their arms and
equipment could not be used for disaster relief. Some heavy machinery, such as excavators and bulldozers, was issued to the involved units at the last moment, but the troops
were not trained to handle it. The majority of the troops were issued light tools, such
as spades and picks. The attempt to remove large concrete pieces of collapsed buildings
with light tools and bare hands turned out to be ineffective and lost time that was precious for saving lives. Inappropriate force structure and equipment and lack of specialized training significantly increased the costs of the Sichuan earthquake relief.66
Again, a major indicator of the relative ineffectiveness of the PLA in the Sichuan
episode was the postquake endorsement of remedies to correct these deficiencies. For
instance, at the CMC meeting held in December 2008 Hu requested the PLA to adopt
for civil-military interagency coordination in command and control a new core-value
concept (核心价值观): “Be loyal to the party, love the people, render service to the state,
dedicate to mission, and uphold honor” (忠于党, 热爱人民, 报效国家, 献身使命, 崇尚
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Photo 7. PLA paratroopers with picks and shovels await transport to the site of the Sichuan earthquake.

荣誉).67 What Hu really means by requiring the PLA to “be loyal to the party” is that the
CMC and other senior PLA officers are to follow the orders of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, of which Wen Jiabao is the second-ranking member. In the same way,
by requesting the PLA to render service to the state, he means that the PLA officers are
to coordinate well with state authorities, including the State Council (headed by Wen) at
the highest level, in fulfilling nonwar military operations, including disaster relief. Similarly, there has been extensive discussion on how to institutionalize, and formalize in law,
civil-military interagency coordination in command and control, particularly in terms
of who issues orders, who follows orders, and what the legal accountability is of various
parties involved concerning these orders.68
With regard to force structure, equipment, and training, Hu reiterated his instruction
to the PLA to “enhance the capabilities of the military to cope with multiple types of
security threat and fulfill diversified military missions” (提高军队应对多种安全威
胁、完成多样化军事任务的能力), outlined in his report to the Seventeenth CCP
Congress of October 2007. This means that the central criteria of PLA combat effectiveness needed to be expanded from traditional preparation for war fighting, narrowly
defined, to the broader areas of counterterrorism, stability operations, and emergency
and natural-disaster relief. As a result, major changes needed to be brought about in
the areas of strategic guidance, interagency coordination–based command and control,
unit specialization, armament and equipment development, and training.69 This call for
a fundamental shift in military missions, however, was implicitly criticized by various
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PLA analysts. PLAAF colonel Dai Xu, for instance, argues that the primary mission of
the elite forces controlled by the services and MRs is defense against foreign invasion. As
a result, they are not organized, armed, or trained for disaster relief. China is prone to
natural disasters, he noted, and using these forces regularly for such a mission will not
only prove ineffective but could harm national security, at a time when China’s external
security environment is still quite grim.70
Toward the end of 2008 and, particularly, in a session with the PLA delegates to the
National People’s Congress annual meeting on 12 March 2009, Hu modified his earlier
instruction to the PLA, seemingly taking into consideration the implicit criticisms of
fundamentally shifting its missions. Hu now instructed the PLA to place “emphasis on
enhancing core military capabilities construction, while at the same time [to] handle well
nonwar military capabilities construction in overall planning” (重点加强核心军事能
力建设，同时统筹搞好非战争军事能力建设). That is, the PLA was to continue to
emphasize preparation to fight and win “local war under informatized conditions.”71
Photo 8. Hu receives PLA delegates attending the second annual meeting of the 11th National
People’s Congress on 11 March 2009.

This modification of policy has two implications. First, rather than requiring the PLA to
shift its missions fundamentally, it points to a division of labor among the elite forces,
the provincial MD–controlled reserve and militia forces, and the PAP. The elite forces
would concentrate on traditional security missions, which also lay a solid basis for
an ability to support nontraditional security missions. The MD reserves and militias
would focus on preparation for nontraditional security missions or nonwar military
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operations, including emergency and natural-disaster relief.72 The elite forces, however,
would support these operations, particularly with transportation and logistics. Moreover, because the elite forces have become more technology-intensive and therefore need
more systematic, lengthy, and uninterrupted training to translate informatized platforms
into combat effectiveness, the PAP would take full responsibility for operations to maintain domestic social stability. As a result, more motorized infantry units of the PLA will
likely be transferred to the PAP to reinforce its mobile units (机动部队).73 Second, the
elite forces would designate units with appropriate specializations and expertise, arms,
equipment, and training (those specializing in engineering, medicine, road construction, transportation, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense) for nonwar military
operations (flood and earthquake relief; nuclear, biological, and chemical disaster relief;
transportation disaster relief; and international peacekeeping).74
The Gulf of Aden Mission: A Success Story?
The PLA’s participation in fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden appeared to be more
successful in terms of civil-military interagency coordination. The fact that no sudden,
unexpected incident (突发事件) was involved allowed more time for planning and
preparation. Also, the PLAN seems to be interested in opportunities to expose itself to
genuine maritime conditions in more distant seas, in order to gain operational experience. Both factors contributed to this success, but more forthcoming PLA cooperation
and coordination with the state authorities to remedy deficiencies revealed in the Sichuan earthquake relief were clearly also important.
The Ministry of Transportation (MT) of China’s State Council first raised the issue of
deploying naval ships to escort Chinese merchant ships against pirates in Gulf of Aden,
at a meeting of the MT and MFA in mid-October 2008. The MT had two concerns. One
was that the piracy issue had become so disruptive that Chinese shipping firms might
have had to breach contracts and so lose global market share; relatedly, four hundred
thousand Chinese merchant mariners needed to be protected. The second was that
diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue through foreign governments and international
organizations had been difficult and ineffective. The MT, MFA, and PLAN quickly
reached consensus on the urgency and importance of the issue after intensive coordination and research on three key issues: capacity, logistic supply, and international law. The
PLAN Military Art Studies Institute (海军军事学术研究所) in Beijing, for instance,
analyzed legal issues concerning counterpiracy naval operations: whether it is legal to
deploy naval ships against pirates; what they can do and how much force they can use;
legal accountability if a warship fails to rescue a vessel under pirate attack; and what
must be done if Chinese naval ships enter Somali territorial waters.75 By 26 December
2008 a naval escort group had set sail for the Gulf of Aden.
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A circular coordination chain has been
introduced for interagency coordination
in command and control in counterpiracy
operations. It begins with voluntary applications of concerned ships, seven days in
advance, to the China Ship Owners Association. The applications are forwarded to the
MT, which analyzes the capacities of the
ships involved, holds coordination conferences, and makes escort recommendations
to the PLAN. The PLAN command decides
on a final escort plan; the MT coordinates
with the merchant ships, directing them to
designated sea areas where the naval ships
are deployed. To enhance effectiveness, a
highly advanced maritime satellite–based
ship-movement tracking system (船舶动态
跟踪系统) has been deployed with newly
developed software that provides alldimensional tracking (全方位跟踪) and video-based communications among all
concerned ships.76
Photo 9. A Chinese warship patrols the sealanes against pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

Room for Improvement
The PLAN’s counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden appears to be a success of civilmilitary interagency coordination. The PLAN’s cooperative behavior here is in contrast
to its earlier reluctance to get involved in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief and in
the evacuation of Chinese nationals threatened by civil unrest in the Solomon Islands in
late April 2006.77 But major issues still exist and need to be resolved in order to reduce
the cost of future crisis management. For instance, the issue of who pays for nonwar
military operations remains unresolved. “Military budgets do not cover nonwar military
operations. But under emergency, the military budget has to be used, and the equipment
can be very expensive. If there is no compensation afterward, routine war preparation
and training would be negatively affected.” Also, if they do not have to compensate the
PLA, civilian authorities may develop the habit of considering military assistance in
crises a “free ride,” making it more difficult for the PLA to cooperate in the future.78
Also, the role of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the State Council is ceremonial. It has no real organization or personnel; the putative functions are fulfilled by the
PLA’s four general departments (staff, political, logistics, and armament). However, those
departments answer to the CMC and its chair, not the premier of the State Council. There
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may be coordination conferences with State Council ministries, but the senior officers
who represent the PLA general departments are likely not to follow the instructions of
the State Council but simply report the proceedings of these conferences to the CMC, if
only for fear of being suspected of institutional disloyalty. Also, the State Council premier,
Wen Jiabao, has no control over the career advancement of senior PLA officers, so the
latter have little incentive to follow his orders. This partly explains why it is difficult for
Wen to order the PLA to do things on his own authority; he has to go through Hu Jintao.
Similarly, his predecessor, Zhu Rongji, had to go through Jiang Zemin to get the PLA out
of business activities when they began to impact the national economy.
Figure 1. China’s Civil-Military Bureaucratic Hierachy
Party (党) = CCP
Politburo and its
Standing
Committee

State (政) = State
Council

Military ( ) =
CMC

MFA, MT, and other
Ministries and
Commissions

GSD, GPD, GLD, GAD

Because the CMC is at the same bureaucratic level as the State Council, it is external to
the State Council, answering only to the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee (see
figure 1).79 But the latter do not meet regularly to manage daily state affairs, and the State
Council, which does, has no administrative jurisdiction over the PLA, making routine
civilian oversight over PLA affairs clearly more difficult. Such a difficulty, however, can be
eased by establishing a genuine, more civilianized MND, one within the State Council and
answering to the premier. A real MND could absorb the majority of the PLA’s four general
departments, which would in turn help streamline the PLA command structure and turn
the CMC into a central, joint command institution of chiefs of services.

Naval Implications of Objective Control and Externalization
As discussed earlier, the sense of insecurity in dealing with military matters, arising from
lack of personal military credentials and their technocratic backgrounds, have generally
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motivated new leaders like Jiang and Hu toward objective control and externalization of
the PLA. The PLAN is clearly the biggest beneficiary of this trend, partly because it is one
of the most technology-intensive services and partly because of the specific environment
in which it operates and of the functions it fulfills. Also, the promotion of the PLAN
by Jiang and Hu and the leveraging of this promotion by the PLAN have combined to
elevate the importance of the navy.
Technology, Environment, and Functions
Objective control allows for more institutional autonomy and military professionalism.
To the extent that the PLAN is much more technology and capital-intensive than the
ground force and therefore requires more systematic, intensive, lengthy, and uninterrupted training to translate technologies into combat effectiveness, institutional autonomy without major political interference clearly benefits the PLAN more than it does
the ground force.80 It is certainly true that objective control should also benefit greatly
the PLAAF and the Second Artillery, because both are also technology and capital-based.
Externalization, however, should benefit the PLAN more than the PLAAF and the Second Artillery, for two major reasons.
One has to do with the operational environments of these services. The environment
in which the PLAAF and Second Artillery operate is mostly nonphysical or one or two“dimensional.” The second reason is a result of the first reason—that is, the functions of
the PLAAF and the Second Artillery tend to be fewer and narrower, mainly in terms of
providing operational support and strategic deterrence. But the environment that the
PLAN operates in is mostly physical and multidimensional, involving the sea surface,
the ocean depths, the air, space, the littoral, and the shore. As a result, the functions that
the PLAN fulfills are more numerous and also broader, which explains why the PLAN
is a comprehensive (综合性) service possessing its own surface combatant, submarine,
air, sea-based strategic deterrence, amphibious assault, and coastal-defense arms. But
whereas the physical environment of the PLA ground force is largely internal, that of
the PLAN is often the high seas—that is, external to national territories—and therefore
necessarily more international (国际性). Because of its comprehensive and international
nature, the PLAN is also a versatile service that can be employed on its own for multiple
tasks in distant areas. They range from traditional security tasks, such as strategic and
local deterrence, sea control and denial operations, and surveillance and countersurveillance, to nontraditional security tasks, such as sea-lane security and counterpiracy operations, naval diplomacy, and international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
As a result, the PLAN is also a strategic (战略性) service.81 On the whole, the PLAN is
clearly more useful in fulfilling the “new historical missions” assigned by Hu to the PLA
generally, missions that aim to externalize the PLA.
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Civil-Military Interactive Dynamics
The PLAN benefits from objective control and externalization also because Jiang and
Hu have actively promoted the PLAN, which in turn has leveraged this priority position.
Both Jiang and Hu have promoted the PLAN, though for different strategic priorities.
For Jiang the top strategic priority, particularly after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, was to
deter Taiwan from declaring formal independence and the United States from intervening militarily in a conflict over Taiwan. As a result, he promoted the PLAN by acquiring
Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines from Russia, as well as indigenously developed more advanced surface and undersea combatants. He paid particular
attention to the East Sea Fleet, deploying the heavy, Russian-built antiship platforms
in that fleet. Because air superiority in any military conflict over Taiwan can be gained
by land-based combat aircraft, Jiang did not endorse the aircraft carrier program for
which Admiral Liu Huaqing, who served as the PLAN commander from 1982 to 1988
and CMC vice chair from 1989 to 1997, had actively lobbied, to provide air cover for
naval operations over the more distant Spratlys, in the South China Sea.82 Instead, Jiang
pursued diplomacy with Southeast Asian countries under his “new security concept,”
leading to China’s signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and of the Declaration of Code of Conduct with
ASEAN with regard to the South China Sea. Jiang even removed a commanding officer
of the South Sea Fleet for advocating, directly to him during an inspection tour of the
fleet, aircraft carriers to resolve the Spratlys issue.83
By the time Hu took over, the naval capabilities thought necessary to deter a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan and U.S. military intervention in its support were
largely in place. As shown in the second of his four new historical missions for the PLA,
Hu wants the military to deter flash points on China’s margins such as the Taiwan issue
from escalating into military conflict, so that China can leverage the twenty-year window of strategic opportunity from 2001 to 2020 to develop its economy.84 But as shown
in the third and fourth historical missions, Hu has other strategic priorities on his mind
as well. The election of the anti-independence candidate Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s
new president in March 2008 made it easier for the PLA to fulfill the second historical
mission, making it possible for Hu to concentrate on the other two historical missions,
in which the PLAN would play a major role, because these missions are largely external.
Hu, for instance, has been particularly concerned about China’s newly emerging national
interests in terms of energy security. As early as at the Central Economic Work Conference held in November 2003, Hu, as the new CCP general secretary, advanced the
concept of oil security (石油安全), and stressed the need to develop a new energydevelopment strategy from a “strategic overall height” (战略全局高度) to achieve
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national energy security.85 Because the South China Sea has potentially rich deposits of
fossil fuels and natural gas and straddles major sea-lanes through the Strait of Malacca
into the Indian Ocean, Hu seems to favor particularly the development of the South Sea
Fleet.
The first PLA unit that Hu inspected after becoming the CCP general secretary, for
instance, was a destroyer flotilla of the South Sea Fleet, and this took place as early as 11
April 2003.86 On 9 April 2008 he inspected the South Sea Fleet again. This time he visited
the naval base at Sanya on Hainan Island, where he instructed: “The navy is a strategic,
comprehensive, and international service. It holds an important position and plays an
important role in safeguarding the security of state sovereignty and territorial integPhoto 10. Hu visits PLAN officers and sailors at Sanya Naval Base of Hainan on 9 April 2008.

rity and national maritime interests.” He particularly requested the PLAN to strive to
develop “powerful” capabilities for accomplishing the new “historical missions” that he
had assigned to the PLA.87 It is also important to note that the first two escort groups for
the Gulf of Aden deployment in the first six months of the mission came from the South
Sea Fleet.
The special attention that Hu has paid to the PLAN is also reflected in his other endeavors. In December 2006, Hu attended the inauguration ceremony for a new-type nuclear
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submarine and conferred a PLA flag upon the captain of the boat.88 Finally, Hu attended
the naval parade in Qingdao to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the PLAN, on
22 April 2009.89
Another indicator of naval promotion by both Jiang and Hu is the increased naval representation in China’s party and PLA central institutions under their rules. In September
2004, for instance, the PLAN commander gained membership in the powerful CMC,
together with the PLAAF and the Second Artillery commanders. This membership has
surely enhanced the PLAN’s bargaining position (as well as those of the PLAAF and
the Second Artillery) in negotiating budgetary allocations, force restructuring, senior
personnel appointments, and weapons acquisition.
Moreover, the navy’s representation in the CCP Central Committee has also increased
under Hu’s tenure. Counting both full and alternate members and excluding the PAP
members, PLA membership constitutes about 17 percent, or sixty-two out of 356, of
the membership of the CCP Central Committee elected at the Sixteenth CCP Congress
of November 2002.90 Out of sixty-two, five (8 percent of the PLA delegation) came
from the PLAN. PLA membership declined to 15.6 percent of the membership of the
CCP Central Committee elected at the Seventeenth CCP Congress of October 2007, or
fifty-eight out of 371. Naval membership, however, grew from five to seven out of the
fifty-eight, or 12 percent of the PLA delegation.91
Finally, many senior positions within PLA central institutions have opened up to senior
PLAN officers under Jiang and Hu. Vice Admiral Sun Jianguo, for instance, now holds
the position of deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, while Vice Admirals Tong Shiping
and Xu Yitian hold the positions of NDU political commissar and National Defense
Science and Technology University political commissar, respectively. Rear Admiral Wang
Zhaohai, on the other hand, held the position of vice president of AMS.92
While Jiang and Hu have actively promoted the PLAN, the PLAN has also leveraged
this promotion well to advance its own institutional interests. Only one month after Hu
became CMC chair in September 2004, researchers from the Navy Military Art Studies
Institute in Beijing published several articles in the October issue of the prestigious Military Art Journal of AMS, arguing for shifting the PLAN strategy from one of “near-sea
active defense” to “far-seas operations.” Their argument was based on the need to secure
newly emerging Chinese interests with respect to increased dependence on maritime resources, energy imports, external trade and investment, merchant fleets, and sea-lanes, as
well as on the need to improve China’s unfavorable maritime strategic posture by breaking out of the narrow, long, and blocked “near seas” in order to gain the initiative.93 This
was clearly an institutional effort of the PLAN to operationalize both Jiang’s and Hu’s

chinese civil - military relations in the post - deng era

39

naval aspirations and promotions, and perhaps even more a response to Hu’s concern
about China’s energy security.
Similarly, in response to Hu’s instruction, given during his inspection tour of Sanya in
April 2008, that senior naval officers follow his neo-Confucian concept of “taking people
as the foremost” (以人为本) by paying particular attention to basic-level units, the PLAN
launched a “Project of Warming Hearts and Benefiting Soldiers” (暖心惠兵工程), meant
to improve the quality of life for PLAN sailors and officers. The project involves construction on shore of living quarters, study facilities, libraries, sports facilities, psychological
counseling facilities, and battlefield-acclimatization facilities in all naval bases, with an
emphasis on humanistic concerns, ecology, and personal privacy. Moving sailors from
ships to land has helped to improve their health, because quarters on board are smaller,
hotter, more humid, more crowded and noisy, and more subject to electromagnetic
radiation, and as a result are more likely to make sailors physically and psychologically ill.
The project has also saved energy costs and lengthened the service lives of ships, because
generating energy on board ship is costly and takes a high toll on power plants. Moreover,
it has helped to protect the environment, because trash disposal on land is easier to manage; there is less trash to pollute harbors and waterways. Finally, the project has helped to
enhance morale, because sailors can eat and rest well on shore after long and exhausting
sea tours.94 Undoubtedly, this quality-of-life improvement effort closely aligns with Hu’s
priorities to improve genuinely both living standards and the environment.
Finally, among all PLA services, the PLAN appears to be most responsive to Hu’s call
to cope with multiple types of threats and fulfill diverse missions, partly because, as
discussed above, the PLAN is more versatile and therefore more appropriate for these
missions. Senior naval officers, for instance, have published major analytical pieces to
operationalize the PLAN role in these missions.95 But more important, the PLAN is
clearly much more amenable to complex interagency cooperation and coordination, as
demonstrated in the counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and as compared to
the PLA’s role in the Sichuan earthquake relief.
Generally speaking, the civil-military interactive dynamics stemming from naval promotion by the central civilian leadership and the PLAN’s skillful leveraging of this promotion are likely to enhance the PLAN’s importance in China’s military modernization.

Conclusions and Analytical Implications
This study shows that even though Jiang was successful in consolidating his power in
the PLA, there is little evidence that he employed the PLA against domestic threats, from
either Chinese society or within the CCP leadership. There were also major institutional limits on the extent of this power consolidation and on Jiang’s use of this power.
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Personnel appointments and budget increases, for instance, may have been driven by
reasons other than an intention to consolidate power in the PLA, and Jiang may have
been unsure that the military would follow his orders to fulfill functions other than
its usual tasks. As a result, the central thrust of his policies to control the PLA was to
enhance civilian governance or the CCP’s legitimacy to rule, through promoting economic growth, and to confine the PLA to narrow, military-technical tasks. These policies
prevented and preempted domestic crises and threats that might have provided excuses
for the PLA to intervene in domestic politics. Jiang’s policies in this regard helped to
maintain civil-military institutional boundaries and therefore increased the internal
cohesion and combat effectiveness of the PLA.
Hu’s policies are similar to Jiang’s. One exception is that Hu has not particularly focused
on consolidating his power in the PLA. While inviting Jiang to help him to deal with the
military, Hu has concentrated on enhancing the CCP’s legitimacy to govern, by promoting more equitable income distribution and sustainable economic growth, and on
adopting programs that confine the PLA to its narrow military-technical tasks. But more
important, he has directed the military to fulfill new external missions, such as defending China’s newly emerging interests in outer, maritime, and electromagnetic space, and
in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. These policies have also
helped him to consolidate power in the PLA.
While objective control benefits PLA modernization, it has also contributed to civilmilitary bifurcation, which has complicated interagency coordination in managing
crises and, as a result, increased the cost of crises. This complication is reflected in both
foreign-policy and domestic crisis cases, including particularly the Sichuan earthquakerelief episode. While policies have been adopted to remedy deficiencies, apparently with
some success, unresolved issues remain.
Finally, the PLA Navy is the biggest beneficiary of objective control and externalization,
partly because it is one of the most technology-intensive services, and partly because
the specific environment in which it operates is mostly physical, multidimensional, and
external, as a result of which its functions are highly diverse. Also, the promotion of the
PLAN by the central civilian leadership and the service’s leveraging of this promotion
are also likely to contribute to the increased importance of the navy in China’s military
modernization.
The findings of this study have three analytical implications. One is that the conventional wisdom on party-army relations in China may be flawed. According to this view, the
CCP leaders, highly insecure in the face of domestic threats both from within the party
and from society, attempt to buy off the military with higher ranks and more money.
In this way, it is often said, the leaders can consolidate their power by controlling the
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military (or part of it) in order to employ it in power struggles against political threats
and opponents; as a result, they can feel more secure. However, such linear thinking neglects the possibility that by employing the military against domestic political opponents
CCP leaders would no doubt reveal their own weaknesses or incompetence, which could
be exploited by the military. As a result, they actually would create a new threat—the
military itself—and thus make themselves feel even less secure.
Roman emperors established the Praetorian Guard to protect them from domestic unrest. Over time, the unit gained independent power and became instrumental in installing and deposing emperors. As its domestic political role increased, its effectiveness in
war waned. The newer generations of CCP leaders may not be students of Greco-Roman
history, but their sense of insecurity—arising from lack of charisma, military credentials,
or close ties with the military—may have convinced them that there are major limits on
how far they can go to consolidate power in the PLA and how they can use this power.
They seem to have adopted an additional way to control the military—that is, enhancing
civilian governance and thereby the CCP’s legitimacy to rule, to prevent and preempt
domestic threats, on the one hand, and to confine the PLA to narrow functionaltechnical and external tasks, on the other. In this way the chances of undesirable military
intervention in politics decline, and as a result the leaders should feel more secure.
Second, as the findings of this study show, an unintended consequence of a Leninist
party-army structure is that if the military is given institutional autonomy and allowed
to increase its professionalism, routine civilian oversight becomes difficult, mainly
because state authorities have no administrative jurisdiction over the military, whereas
the party, which controls the military, does not manage daily state affairs. The effects are
particularly pronounced in unexpected crises. Accordingly, the extent of efforts to introduce new institutional arrangements to ease this difficulty should be carefully analyzed;
they may have important implications for China’s future crisis management.
Finally, the extent of military involvement in domestic politics is closely related to the
degree of the military’s institutional autonomy and level and types of its technological
development. If this is true, research should continue to focus on the evolving relationship between these two key variables in China. This is because such a focus may help to
reveal both the level of civilian governance–based political and social stability and the
degree and types of technological development of the military. But more important, if
domestic political and social stability can be achieved and maintained in China, more
analytical attention should be paid to technological development in the PLA. This development has widened and deepened during the past twenty years, and it may have major
implications for Asian and global security.
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E
G

M

N
P

R

AMS

Academy of Military Science

ASAT

antisatellite

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CDIC

Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission

CMC

Central Military Commission

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

GAD

General Armament Department

GLD

General Logistics Department

GPD

General Political Department

GSD

General Staff Department

MD

military district

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MND

Ministry of National Defense (of the State Council)
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military region
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NDU

National Defense University
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